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The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform
School for Agriculture
Jeffrey J. Steinle
Agricultural protectionism has played hooky from global
trade reforms for decades. 1 A desire for economic security and
independence prompts governments to subsidize their domestic
agricultural sectors disproportionately compared to other indus-
tries.2 Such protectionism impedes international trade and dra-
matically distorts trade in agriculture. 3 Although protectionism
conflicts directly with the free trade purposes of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 4 exceptions have been
consistently created for agricultural products from the inception
1. See, e.g., Jon G. Fiipek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative Advan-
tage: The Prospects for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of
GATT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 123, 128 (1989). Filipek notes that the
first recorded instance of state intervention in the interest of long-term food
security is found in the Book of Genesis. Id. at 128 n.40. "There, Pharaoh,
placing considerable confidence in Joseph's interpretation of his dream, built
grainaries to store one-fifth of the harvest of Egypt during the seven fat years
for use during the seven lean years." Genesis 41:33-37. Indeed, the New Deal
farm policy was rooted in a modern application of Joseph's grain storage recom-
mendation. See Henry A. Wallace, Definition of the Ever Normal Granary,
AGRIC. SITUATION, Mar. 1937, at 9.
2. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE
FOR POWER AND PEACE 115-16 (6th ed. 1985). Numerous instances exemplify
the basis for a nation's desire to avoid dependence on other nations for food.
The blockade against Germany forced a quicker end to World War I, and signifi-
cantly contributed to Nazi policies of starvation and outright killing to preserve
the food supply in World War II. Id. at 115. Also during World War II, Great
Britain's dependence on imports for 70% of its food required it to concentrate its
wartime tactics on maneuvers that it could win quickly. Id.
3. See generally MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FARM SUPPORT PoL-
CIES (Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds., 1989) (analyzing country specific effects of
agricultural subsidies); see infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (identify-
ing costs of farm subsidization).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21, GATI Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT 1994]. The Final Act of the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement) were
signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April 1994. The WTO Agree-
ment includes the GAIT 1994, which is based on the text of the original GATT
1947 as amended.
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of the GATT until the most recent round of negotiations.5 The
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture6 (the "Agreement")
reforms trade by eliminating many of these exceptions and by
treating agricultural products more similarly to manufactured
products. 7
This Note examines the Uruguay Round Agreement on Ag-
riculture and the effectiveness of its innovations. Trade liberali-
zation of agriculture will have enormous benefits in cost savings
and increased efficiency. The practical questions, however, are
whether countries have the political fortitude to adhere to the
Agreement and whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) s
is equipped to enforce the requirements of the Agreement. Part
I examines the historical rationales behind agricultural support
policies. Part I further discusses the economic distortions pro-
duced by these policies, and conversely, the macroeconomic ben-
efits that will result from trade liberalization. Part II surveys
the role played by agriculture in previous GATT rounds. Part
III details the central components of the Agreement, focusing on
market access, export subsidies, and domestic support. Part IV
examines specific obstacles to domestic support reductions in-
cluding the multiple exceptions to, and implementation difficul-
ties of, the Agreement. This Note concludes that the primary
benefit of the Agreement lies not in its immediate impact on lib-
eralizing trade of agricultural products, but rather in the frame-
work it establishes for future trade liberalization.
5. The first seven rounds of GATT negotiations largely ignored agricul-
ture. Filipek, supra note 1, at 139; see infra part II.
6. Agreement on Agriculture, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT
SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 39, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement].
7. Stefan Tangermann, An Assessment of the Agreement on Agriculture, in
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE NEW
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 143, 145 (Geoff Raby ed., 1994).
Tangermann states that "[i]t is hard to overestimate the significance of the
Uruguay Round for the agricultural sector. An important sector in world trade
which had escaped most GATT disciplines since the inception of the General
Agreement is now for the first time effectively brought fully into the GAIT." Id.
at 145.
8. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 6, GATT Sales No.
1994-4 (1994).
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I. PROTECTIONIST POLICIES IN AGRICULTURE AND
THEIR RELATED COSTS
A. FORCES UNDERLYING AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT
Many countries aim to achieve self-sufficiency in agricul-
tural products.9 Countries justify self-sufficiency with the prop-
osition that dependence on other countries for food can lead to
political subservience.10 They argue that subsidies and other
government support of agriculture are necessary because the
ability to withhold food from a dependent country can create a
significant political advantage.'" A food embargo, for example,
can detrimentally affect a country during war.12 Even outside of
war, economic sanctions, including those that restrict food sup-
plies, have been used to address human rights abuses13 and dis-
9. See, e.g., Al J. Daniel, Agricultural Reform: The European Community,
the Uruguay Round, and International Dispute Resolution, 46 ARK. L. REv. 873,
876 (1994) (stating that self-sufficiency was the primary objective of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy of the European Community).
10. MORGENTHAU, supra note 2, at 115. Morgenthau describes the difficul-
ties facing nations with deficient agricultural resources. Wartime blockades on
nations were instrumental in Allied victories in both World Wars. Id. Even
today, with a worldwide surplus of food and excess capacity, many countries
have inadequate food supplies. See William M. Miner & Dale E. Hathaway,
World Agriculture in Crisis: Reforming Government Policies, in WORLD AGRI-
CULTURAL TRADE: BUILDING A CONSENSUS 37, 44-45 (1988). A 1980 World
Bank study estimated that up to 730 million people have insufficient food. Id.
Thus, food embargoes against nations with inadequate food remain powerful
political and economic tools.
11. For an in-depth analysis of the use of economic sanctions, including
agricultural sanctions, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S.
TRADE (1990). Malloy discusses in detail the use of economic sanctions by the
United States against North Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Egypt,
Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, South Africa, Panama and Iraq. Malloy's analysis fo-
cuses on how economic sanctions can be used strategically both to manipulate
long-term political relations and in response to specific acts. See also BARRY E.
CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD
U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988).
12. MORGENTHAU, supra note 2, at 130. Food embargoes can sap the will of
a civilian population whose capacity to support a patriotic effort is already
stretched by the additional burdens of a wartime economy. Ultimately, the goal
of a food embargo is to restrict provisions given to troops. While this is less of
an issue in today's technologically modern wars, supply difficulties can still
have a major impact, as demonstrated by the Persian Gulf conflict. Thousands
of Iraqi military personnel surrendered during the Persian Gulf war. Many
were described as "barefoot boys and malnourished older men." Guy Gugliotta
& Steve Coil, Bush Says Iraq has Agreed to Meet with Allies, WASH. POST, Mar.
1, 1991, at Al.
13. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 11, at 12 (describing sanctions against
South Africa in response to its apartheid policies).
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suade countries from pursuing military goals.' 4 Thus, to
preserve national independence, governments subsidize agricul-
ture beyond the level necessary to meet current food needs. 15
Subsidization encourages growth in the agricultural base and
the resulting surpluses provide food security and independence.
To ensure that the agricultural base remains strong, gov-
ernments must encourage commitment of both personnel and fi-
nancial resources to agriculture. Farm support policies are
necessary to maintain production due to the nature of farming.' 6
Cyclical prices, variable production needs, and unpredictable
weather all affect farming. Governments claim to mitigate these
risks by making certain guarantees to agricultural producers.
Such support increases the attractiveness of farming and
thereby maintains high and consistent output.
Strong political support for farm programs is also a driving
force behind protectionism. In the United States, for example,
the support is due to several factors. First, farm groups and ag-
ricultural industries have a powerful lobby in Congress.' 7 Sec-
ond, farm states have a disproportionate voice in Congress. The
14. For example, the 1921 threat by the League of Nations to impose sanc-
tions influenced Yugoslavia's decision to abandon attempts to seize territory
from Albania. CARTER, supra note 11, at 9 n.8. The 1979 grain embargo
against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan is another ex-
ample of a peaceable attempt to thwart war. MALLOY, supra note 11, at 213.
The problem with such embargoes is the inability to measure precisely their
consequences. Id. The grain embargo against the Soviets has been dismissed
as having little effect on food supplies in the Soviet Union and rather dramatic
effects on the economic health of American farmers. Id. While it is true that
the Soviets were able to bypass the embargo through sources such as Argen-
tina, it is unknown whether the embargo factored into the Soviet military deci-
sion. It is also difficult to analyze the embargo's effect on U.S. grain producers
in isolation from other factors.
15. MORGENTHAU, supra note 2, at 131.
16. Miguel Montana-Mora, International Law and International Relations
Cheek to Cheek: An International Law /International Relations Perspective on
the U.S. /E.C. Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COMM. REG. 1, 12 n.48 (1993) (citing Eduardo Moyano Estrada, Una Aproxi ma-
ci6n Sociopolitica al Proteccionismo en la Agricultura, 666 INFORMACION
COMERCIAL ESPANOLA 163 (1989)). Other rationales for support include envi-
ronmental concerns and the desire to maintain part of the population in rural
areas. Id.
17. See generally WILLIAM P. BROWNE, PRIVATE INTERESTS, PUBLIC POLICY
AND AMERICAN AGRICULTURE (1988) (examining agricultural farm lobbies in the
United States). The tobacco lobby is consistently among the top contributors to
both Democrats and Republicans. Roger D. Sharpe, Increased Tax Could Re-
duce Fires: Phase Out the Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at A22. Polit-
ical support of agricultural programs has great potential for future growth as
industry groups such as large food producers join with the existing agricultural
lobby to encourage governmental subsidies and inexpensive food supplies.
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U.S. Senate is structured so that rural agricultural states such
as North Dakota and Nebraska enjoy equal representation with
New York or California.' 8 Moreover, congressional friends of
agricultural support policies include political heavyweights such
as Senate majority leader Robert Dole and House Agriculture
Committee chair Pat Roberts, both of wheat-producing Kansas,
Jesse Helms of tobacco-producing North Carolina, and Patrick
Leahy of Vermont, former chair of the Senate Agriculture Com-
mittee. 19 Finally, romantic concepts of idyllic fields and self-de-
terminism pervade American visions of farm life and the
political debate over farm programs. 20
Agricultural liberalization is especially subject to legislative
opposition in most countries due to a classic prisoners' di-
lemma. 21 The three major players in the Agreement, the United
George Anthan, Changing Scene of Ag Policy, Gannet News Service, Feb. 27,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, GNS File.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 1. A bias for rural representation existed
in the House of Representatives as well until a series of court decisions in the
1960s required states to draw legislative districts according to population
rather than land mass. See Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV.
809, 824 (1995) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
19. In a letter to President Clinton dated April 20, 1994, 16 of the 17 mem-
bers of the Senate Agriculture Committee warned the president that they
would not vote for the Uruguay Round implementing bill if the Administration
proposed reductions in agriculture-related spending to offset the lost revenues
caused by the Agreement. Farm State Senators Warn Clinton on Ag Program
Cuts to Pay for GATT, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 648 (Apr. 27, 1994).
Yet the Agreement explicitly calls for reductions in export subsidies by 36% of
budget. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9:2. The letter indicates the stance typi-
cally taken by members of Congress from agriculture states, especially during
an election year.
20. This agricultural idealism pervades popular culture as well as politics.
Movies glorifying the sanctity of the family farm and benefits such as Farm Aid
were steady fare during the 1980s. See Paul Antasio, Movies 'The River', WASH.
POST, Jan. 11, 1985, at B1; Nelson Optimistic About Farm-Aid 11, L.A. TIMES,
April 30, 1986, at 4. Such idealism about agriculture is not a strictly American
phenomenon. An explicit objective of the Common Agriculture Policy of the Eu-
ropean Community is to maintain a countryside dotted with family farms. THE
DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 12 (Bulletin
of the European Communities Supplement 5/91) cited in Daniel, supra note 9,
at 883. See generally Chen, supra note 18 (analyzing the entrenchment of popu-
lar support for farming).
21. But see Andrew B. Stoeckel et al., Overview to MACROECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF FARM SUPPORT POLICIES 12 (Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds., 1989)
(analyzing how even unilateral changes increase economic efficiency). The edi-
tors contend: "The corruption of the proposition that 'liberal (free) trade is the
best policy for all countries' to the flawed proposition that 'liberal (free) trade is
a good policy only if all countries practice it' is a victory for vested interests over
informed public understanding of the gains from trade." Id. (quoting J. Tumlir,
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States, the European Union (EU) and Japan, stand to benefit if
the restrictions on agricultural trade are removed.22 If any of
these countries is able to maintain more of its protectionist poli-
cies than the others, however, producers in that country stand to
gain dramatically through increased exports and higher domes-
tic prices. 23 Thus, once other nations have agreed to reduce pro-
tectionism, special interests drive legislators to maintain
protectionist agricultural policies. The potential for this out-
come slows reform and minimizes the likelihood of trade
liberalization.
B. EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS
Developed countries use three primary policy instruments
to support agriculture: internal price supports;24 border restric-
tions such as tariffs, quotas, and restrictive licensing measures;
and export subsidies. 25 Most countries also provide support for
the agricultural sector through "soft" support policies such as
agricultural extension programs, research, inspection, domestic
food aid, and environmental programs. 26 The combination of
soft programs with standard domestic support policies provides
an incentive for farmers to increase production.
International Economic Order and the Decline of Multilateralism, presented at
ACT Economics Society, Canberra (Mar. 23, 1983)).
22. Former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Clayton Yeutter, has stated:
"We in the U.S. must spend enormous sums of money to counter, directly or
indirectly, the farm policies of competitor nations. If we can convince those na-
tions to change their policies over time, we can afford to change ours too." Ad-
dress by Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter to the American Soybean
Associations's Annual Expo, July 24, 1989 (Des Moines, Iowa), quoted in Alan
Charles Raul & Kevin J. Brosch, Global Trade in Agricultural Products, in
TRADE LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE 1989, at 229, 232 n.3 (PLI Comm. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 510, 1989).
23. See, e.g., U.S. Should not Rush into GATT Agreement on Agriculture
Trade, Key Senate Aide Says, BNA Intl Trade Daily, Apr. 9, 1991, available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAITD File. Charles Riemenschneider, staff director of
the U.S. Senate Agriculture Committee, summed up the opposition to unilat-
eral trade liberalization by stating that "Congress will want to see which way
the EC is going" before agreeing to any significant changes in the Agreement on
Agriculture. Id. Most other countries take a "wait and see" approach as well.
24. The most common price support in the United States is the deficiency
payment which pays farmers the difference between a legislated target price
and the market price. See Thomas L. Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A
Threat to the GATT and Global Free Trade, 24 ST. MARY's L.J. 1165, 1185
(1993). In 1991, deficiency payments accounted for $30 billion of the $52 billion
appropriated by the U.S. government for agriculture. Id.
25. See id. at 1179.
26. See Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 5:2.
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The United States currently has a comprehensive system of
agricultural subsidies and programs to provide support for a va-
riety of producers. 27 This system includes product-specific sub-
sidies for wheat, feed grains, rice, dairy, tobacco, sugar, oilseeds,
honey, wool, and peanuts. 28 Through a general category of
"other non-basic agricultural commodities," the United States
also has programs for many other agricultural products.29
The paradox of U.S. agricultural programs is that agricul-
tural export gains have not kept pace with increases in produc-
tivity. U.S. agricultural production has more than doubled since
1948.30 Even though the most significant gains occurred as a
result of technological advances throughout the 1960s and
1970s, production continues to rise. Farm productivity rose
twenty-five percent from 1982 to 1991.31 Meanwhile, exports of
farm products have remained relatively static since 1980.32 The
resulting surplus has not been met by increases in consumption
27. In the 1930s, as part of President Roosevelt's New Deal, the United
States began its current national farm policy with a comprehensive system of
protectionism including import quotas, production control programs, price sup-
ports, and export subsidies. Montana-Mora, supra note 16, at 11. Although
U.S. farm policy has not changed significantly since the New Deal, every five
years Congress must reauthorize the 1949 farm bill to set policy. Consequently,
certain periods are associated with different realizations and reprioritizations
of funds expended on agriculture. See Filipek, supra note 1, at 132. During the
1960s, for example, decisions regarding agricultural production were influenced
by concerns about predictions of worldwide food scarcity. Raul & Brosch, supra
note 22, at 253-54. As a result, U.S. farm policies were expanded both for hu-
manitarian reasons and the commercial opportunities presented by increased
worldwide demand. Id.
28. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
107 Stat. 314 (1993).
29. See Agricultural Act of 1949, § 301, 63 Stat. 1051 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
30. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 380 (1994). Using 1982 as the
base year with a measurement value of 100, farm output in 1948 measured 48
while output in 1991 measured 110. Id. The percentage of Americans em-
ployed in agriculture has decreased from 6.7% in 1950 to 1.6% in 1993. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS BUREAu STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 395 (1994). Thus,
farm output per unit of labor has increased by a factor of 6, from 19 in 1948 to
125 in 1991. ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 380.
31. ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 30, at 380. While
most industries may not consider a 25% increase over ten years unusual, it is
noteworthy that this productivity increase occurred during the farm recession
of the mid-1980s.
32. See id. at 383. While it is true that exports increased substantially
throughout the 1970s, recent statistics show that they are leveling off. Total
exports in 1980 were valued at $41.2 billion, while for the first 11 months of
1993 exports were valued at $38.5 billion. Id.
1995] 339
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or decreases in imports.33 Instead, the U.S. government has
been forced to either purchase unconsumed products or pay for
their storage.
The total cost of agricultural programs to developed coun-
tries is substantial. Worldwide agricultural subsidies total ap-
proximately $150 billion annually. 34 Although the yearly
amount in the United States varies by several billion dollars, 35
over the past ten years the U.S. Department of Agriculture has
spent an average of $20 billion per year on agricultural pro-
grams.3 6 The cost of protectionism to U.S. taxpayers and con-
sumers, including both direct governmental outlays and
increased food prices, totaled $67 billion in 1989. 3 7 Agricultural
programs in the EU and Japan subsidize farmers to an even
greater extent than those in the United States. 38
Moreover, these figures represent only the direct expendi-
tures. Resultant inefficiencies and economic distortions further
exacerbate the costs. 39 One study estimates that the U.S. gov-
33. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 453 (1993).
34. Statement of Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Before the
House Committee on Agriculture (July 19, 1989), quoted in Raul & Brosch,
supra note 22, at 232 n.3.
35. Budget of the United States Government, Historical Tables 40-42
(1995).
36. See id.
37. Jimmye S. HiUman, Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: A United
States Perspective, 28 TuLsA L.J. 761, 764 (1993).
38. See Daniel, supra note 9, at 881. Two-thirds of the EU's budget is often
required for agricultural market support. In 1992, over ECU 36 billion was
expended on the Common Agricultural Policy, accounting for 58% of the total
EU budget. Id. The total cost of EU protectionism, including both direct gov-
ernmental outlays and increased food prices, totaled $97.5 billion in 1989. Hill-
man, supra note 37, at 790. In Japan, governmental expenditures and
consumer transfers totaled $57.8 billion. Id.
39. Another fundamental detriment to world trade is increased trade ten-
sions as countries attempt to dump increasingly devalued agricultural products
on foreign markets. Stoeckel, supra note 21, at 1, 9-10. This conflict was illus-
trated dramatically in the disagreement between the United States and the Eu-
ropean Community (EC) over agricultural quotas. See Hernicus A. Strating,
The GATT Agriculture Dispute: A European Perspective, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 305, 347 (1993). The oilseeds dispute began in 1962 when the
United States secured a zero-duty-binding for exports of oilseeds to the EC. Id.
After the binding was secured, the EC offered direct subsidies to European pro-
ducers. Id. The United States complained and a GATT panel has twice found
the EC to be in violation of the agreement. Id. The EC has largely ignored
these findings and considerable tension between the two powers has resulted.
Id. These trade tensions resulted in both subtle and overt retaliation in other
markets. See Raul & Brosch, supra note 22, at 231.
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erment spends over $80,000 per year for each farm job saved.40
Massive expenditures on agricultural support also shift re-
sources from unsubsidized to subsidized goods and from other
sectors of the economy, thereby affecting labor and land alloca-
tion. Price support and guaranteed income programs, for exam-
ple, create incentives to use land for agriculture which may
otherwise be put to other uses. 41 This negatively effects the
economy and the environment. 42 Removing agricultural subsi-
dies and other support programs worldwide would shift re-
sources back to their optimal use and increase global social
welfare.
The benefits of trade liberalization are startling. Despite
the alarm of isolationists and mercantilists who argue that in
trade there are winners and losers, studies demonstrate that the
benefits of free trade accrue to all types of trading nations. De-
veloping countries stand to gain $26 billion per year in real in-
come through trade liberalization. 43 Germany could gain an
additional 850,000 jobs.44 The United States could reduce its
trade deficit by $42 billion.45 Furthermore, these studies isolate
the effects of trade liberalization by individual countries. 46 The
worldwide net benefits could be even greater if trade liberaliza-
tion occurs concurrently. 47
40. Thomas W. Hertel et al., Economywide Effects of Unilateral Trade and
Policy Liberalization in U.S. Agriculture, in MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF FARM SUPPORT POLICIES 260, 261 (Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds., 1989).
41. Absent agricultural support, marginal land will lie fallow if it is not
economically profitable. During the 1970s, for instance, when agricultural sup-
port was expanding in the United States, more than 60 million acres of farm-
land were added to the U.S. production base. Raul & Brosch, supra note 22, at
255.
42. See Chen, supra note 18, at 872.
43. Thomas Loo & Edward Tower, Agricultural Protectionism and the Less
Developed Countries: The Relationship between Agricultural Prices, Debt Serv-
icing Capacities, and the Need for Development Aid, in MACROECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF FARM SUPPORT POLICIES 64, 79-80 (Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds.,
1989).
44. Hugo Dicke et al., Effects of Agricultural Trade Liberalization on West
Germany's Economy, in MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FARM SUPPORT
POLICIES 125, 127 (Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds., 1989).
45. Andrew Feltenstein, Agricultural Policies and the U.S. Federal Budget
and U.S. Trade Deficit, in MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FARM SUPPORT
POLICIES 200, 201 (Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds., 1989).
46. Stoeckel, supra note 21, at 15-16.
47. Id. Multilateral trade liberalization creates worldwide welfare gains as
consumers in protectionist countries gain access to cheaper goods and as produ-
cers in efficient countries gain access to new markets. See id.
1995]
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Economic analysis of agricultural programs illustrates the
inefficiencies created on a global scale. The trident of direct
costs to taxpayers and consumers, increases in trade tensions,
and inefficient resource allocation results in monumental costs.
These factors, coupled with the budgetary concerns of the
United States and the EU, drove reform of agricultural trade in
the Uruguay Round.
II. HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT
Despite the enormous trade distortions and costs of agricul-
tural protectionism, the GATT has done little to reform trade in
agriculture since its inception in 1947. Agriculture was largely
ignored during the early rounds of the GATT. 48 Of the eight
GATT rounds since World War II, seven focused on manufactur-
ing.49 Nevertheless, although the Uruguay Round was the first
to focus primarily on agriculture,50 important discussions oc-
curred during the Dillon, Kennedy and Tokyo rounds which
served as prologues for the changes instituted in the Uruguay
Round. 51
During the Dillon Round, the United States feared that the
Common Agricultural Policy of the new European Community
(EC) would result in higher duties than had previously existed
under the policies of individual European countries. 52 As a re-
sult, negotiators discussed agriculture extensively. Although
only a few items received reduced tariffs, those products (such as
soybeans) quickly became some of the most traded items be-
tween the United States and the EC.53
The Kennedy Round discussions were also dominated by the
dispute over market access between the United States and the
EC.54 There was some discussion of guaranteed access, but be-
cause of the low offer by the EC, the proposal was quickly aban-
48. See Filipek, supra note 1, at 139.
49. See Hillman, supra note 37, at 763.
50. Filipek, supra note 1, at 139.
51. The Dillon Round was conducted from 1961 to 1962; the Kennedy
Round from 1964 to 1967; the Tokyo Round from 1974 to 1979.
52. The United States requested guaranteed access to the EC market in
exchange for releases from tariff bindings. Filipek, supra note 1, at 139. The
EC denied the request and ultimately agreed to conduct future negotiations on
tariffs of agricultural products. Id.
53. See Raul & Brosch, supra note 22, at 244.
54. Filipek, supra note 1, at 140-41. Historically, GAIT allowed quantita-
tive restrictions for agricultural products while prohibiting them for manufac-
tured goods. Miner & Hathaway, supra note 10, at 58. Discussions about
market access centered around eliminating most of these restrictions and low-
342 [Vol. 4:333
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doned. 55 The EC introduced a new concept, margin of support,
which ultimately played a key role in the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment on Agriculture. 56 Margin of support centers on the recog-
nition that support for agricultural products comes from a
variety of sources.57 While previous negotiations focused on im-
port barriers, 58 margin of support accounts for other measures
such as price supports and subsidies, as well as administrative
support.59 Essentially, margin of support includes any method
that a government uses to provide higher incomes for producers
than would be received under free-market conditions. Although
this approach was abandoned when the United States discov-
ered that the EC sought to use margin of support as a way to
maintain their variable levy,60 its introduction laid important
groundwork for adoption of the concept during the Uruguay
Round.
The Tokyo Round attained modest success in liberalizing
agricultural trade, producing three general agreements. 61 The
ering tariffs so that the effects of the quantitative restrictions would not be
duplicated.
55. The United States sought a 15% share of the EC grain market for im-
ports and the Europeans offered only a 10% share. Filipek, supra note 1, at
141. The primary legacy of the Kennedy Round for agriculture was the failure
of the International Grains Arrangement, an attempt to fix prices and market
shares globally. JOHN W. EvANs, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE
POLIcy: THE TWILIGHT OF THE GATT? 289-91 (1971). This failure extinguished
interest in commodity agreements which had been used previous to the Ken-
nedy Round with modest success. See id.
56. Filipek, supra note 1, at 141-42.
57. Id.; see infra part III.C.
58. Previous negotiations primarily targeted tariffs and quantitative re-
strictions. Filipek, supra note 1, at 141-42.
59. Id. Margin of support is similar to a "producer subsidy equivalent" in
that it equals the subsidy that would have to be given to agricultural producers
to keep their incomes at the same level if all other farm programs were re-
moved. Stefan Tangermann et al., Multilateral Negotiations on Farm-Support
Levels, 10 WORLD ECON. 265, 266 (1987). "Producer subsidy equivalent" is the
term used by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). Id. at 265.
60. EVANS, supra note 55, at 211. The variable levy is a protection device
whereby a minimum price to be received by domestic producers is set and prod-
ucts from other countries are not allowed to enter the market without paying an
amount slightly more than the difference between the market price and the
minimum price for domestic producers. Id. at 83. The variable levy was writ-
ten into the EC's plan because the reference price was unique to each country
and border protection could be increased if the offering price fell below the ref-
erence price. Id. at 210-11.
61. The changes wrought during the Tokyo Round are best understood in
relation to the overall changes in agricultural trade which were occurring at the
time. Trade in agricultural products was expanding at the fastest rate in his-
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first agreement significantly reduced traditional tariffs on, and
trade barriers to, agricultural products.62 The second provided
forums for resolving trade disputes over dairy products and
beef.63 The third agreement established a code of conduct which
attempted to minimize non-tariff trade barriers that take the
form of standards, product certification and testing require-
ments. 64 The Tokyo Round failed, however, to curb the EC's use
of export subsidies. 65
During earlier rounds of negotiation, significant agricul-
tural trade reform was merely a GATT sideshow. While some
trade liberalization occurred, its primary importance was in lay-
ing the groundwork for later negotiations. Negotiations in the
Kennedy Round sought agreement on market access; the Tokyo
Round sought to eliminate export subsidies. It was not until the
Uruguay Round, however, that these ideas coalesced and agri-
culture took center stage.
III. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT
ON AGRICULTURE
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture modifies ag-
ricultural trade in three principal areas. First, the Agreement
provides greater market access by bringing agricultural prod-
ucts within the confines of GATT limits on non-tariff barriers.
Second, it bans all new export subsidies and establishes meas-
ures by which existing export subsidies are reduced. Third, the
tory. Hillman, supra note 37, at 767. At the same time, however, agricultural
trade relations between the EC and the United States were changing due to a
substantial drop in European imports of agricultural products from 1973 to
1980. See Montana-Mora, supra note 16, at 20. Because the decline was due to
extensive subsidies, the United States became increasingly concerned that its
own agricultural market might be negatively affected. See John F. Hudson, The
European Community's Common Agricultural Policy, in SENATE COMM. ON AG-
RICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., TRADE POLICY PER-
SPECTIVES: SETTING THE STAGE FOR 1985 AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION 323, 323-
28 (Comm. Print 98-263, 1984). The Common Agricultural Policy has been de-
scribed as the foremost example of a managed-market approach to farm sup-
port. Id. The EC relied almost exclusively on subsidies to guarantee income for
farmers. Id. at 327. Although some programs existed to decrease production,
they were negligible. Id. at 325-27.
62. Filipek, supra note 1, at 143. The United States, for example, received
$3.8 billion in tariff and non-tariff barrier concessions. Id. at 143 n.162.
63. See id. at 143. Dispute resolution forums were created to resolve trade
disputes ovr meat and dairy products and international councils were estab-
lished for information exchange and consultations. Id. at 144.
64. Id. at 143-44.
65. See GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND
NEGOTIATION 119-20 (1986).
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Agreement requires reductions in domestic support by establish-
ing an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) for trade-distorting
domestic policies and by providing timetables for specified cuts.
A. MARKET ACCESS
The market access provisions of the Agreement mandate
tariffication 66 of all non-tariff border measures.6 7 The market
access provisions within the Agreement apply the principle of
GATT Article XI to agricultural products by providing that
members "shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any meas-
ures of the kind which have been required to be converted into
ordinary customs duties."68 Tariffs are the preferred measure
as they are more transparent and thus an easier basis for nego-
tiation.69 The measures to be converted include quantitative
import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import
prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures main-
tained through state-trading enterprises, and voluntary export
restraints.70 The Agreement also includes a catchall provision
covering "similar border measures other than customs duties." 71
The conversion of non-tariff border restrictions to tariffs signals
that agricultural products are no longer afforded the myriad ex-
ceptions that are unavailable for manufactured goods.7 2
66. Tariffication is the replacement of non-tariff barriers with tariffs that
provide an equivalent level of protection. Tariff equivalents are equal to the
difference between the world market price and the domestic price with non-
tariff barriers in place. See THE INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE RE-
SEARCH CONSORTIUM, THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: AN
EVALUATION 29 (Commissioned Paper No. 9, 1994) [hereinafter IATRC EVALUA-
TION]. The determination of these tariffs is controversial as it is easy to manip-
ulate a tariff equivalent through the use of divergent internal and border price
data. Id.
67. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4:2. The Agreement exempts measures
maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-
agriculture provisions of the GATT. Id.
68. Id. GATT Article XI provides in relevant part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. XI:1 (emphasis added).
69. Frieder Roessler, The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade
Order, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 53, 58-
59 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993).
70. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4:2 n.1.
71. Id.
72. IATRC EVALUATION, surpa note 66, at 6.
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The Agreement also requires that the tariffs resulting after
conversion of non-tariff barriers be reduced. Tariff reductions
are based on each country's tariff schedule, averaging a total of
36% over six years for developed countries. 73 For individual tar-
iffs, the minimum reduction is 15%,74 limiting the extent to
which a country may maintain protectionist border measures for
some products by more drastically reducing tariffs on others.
Market access provisions require a minimum market share
for imports and the maintenance of import quantities above
1986-88 levels. Market access provisions initially provide im-
ports access to at least 3% of the domestic market, and to at
least 5% by the end of the six-year implementation period.75
Countries are to apply "low or minimal" duties to achieve the
targeted market shares. 76 While imports already comprise 3%
of many markets,77 the market share guarantee creates a hedge
against hidden protectionism. Furthermore, minimum access
requirements, such as the 5% market share target, secure trade
gains that should result naturally from tariff reductions.78
In addition to the market share targets, the quantity of im-
ports must also be kept at a level no lower than the 1986-88
base period.79 Current access opportunities specified in the
schedules "shall be maintained and increased over the imple-
mentation period."80 This requirement safeguards against trade
decreases that could result if tariffication creates greater protec-
tion than the original non-tariff measures.8 1 Moreover, the
quantity requirement reinforces the minimum percentage re-
quirement. If the consumed amount of a product increases, the
73. Id. at 8. Developing countries may reduce their tariffs at a lower rate
than developed countries. Scheduled tariff reductions for developing countries
average 24% over 10 years. Id.
74. Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 5:6. The minimum tariff reduction for
developing countries is 5%. IATRC EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 8.
75. Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 5:6. The minimum access require-
ment for developing countries is 2% with increases leading to a level of 4% after
10 years. Id. Annex 5:7.
76. IATRC EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 9.
77. For example, even in the highly protectionist EU, its various preferen-
tial schemes and previous bilateral negotiations allow imports of more than 3%
for most products. Id. at 49.
78. See id. at 9.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments
Under the Reform Programme 2, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/MA/W/24 (Dec. 23,
1993) (note by the Chairman of the Market Access Group) [hereinafter Chair-
man's Note].
81. See infra text accompanying notes 99-102 for a discussion of "dirty"
tariflication.
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minimum market share requirement dictates that the quantity
of imports must increase as well. If the consumed amount de-
creases, the percentage of imports must increase to keep pace
with the minimum quantity requirement.
The impact of the market access provisions is weakened by
several exceptions. One exception is the Special Safeguards Pro-
vision "which can be invoked on those products subject to tariffi-
cation if imports rise too rapidly or import prices fall too low."8 2
The volume safeguard is tied to "trigger levels" at which a coun-
try may increase tariffs to lessen the impact of tariffication.8 3
Upon reaching the trigger level, tariffs on that product may be
increased by one-third for the remainder -of the year. 4 When
market access opportunities are less than or equal to 10%, the
additional tariff may be applied after the quantity of imports
equals 125% of the preceding three-year average.8 5 When mar-
ket access opportunities are 10 to 30%, or greater than 30%, the
trigger levels are 110% and 105%, respectively.8 6 The price safe-
guard allows countries to impose increasingly higher tariffs as
the difference between the import price and a reference price8 7
increases.8 8 Additional marginal tariffs of 30, 50, 70, and 90%
may be applied as the gap widens.8 9 In some respects, the Spe-
82. Dale E. Hathaway & Merlinda D. Ingco, Agricultural Liberalization
and the Uruguay Round, presented at THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOP-
ING ECONOMIES: A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 20 (Jan. 26-27, 1995). The prod-
ucts subject to the Special Safeguard Provisions are designated on the
schedules with the symbol "SSG". Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5:1. The Spe-
cial Safeguard Provisions may be invoked if-
(a) the volume of imports of that product entering the customs terri-
tory of the Member granting the concession during any year ex-
ceeds a trigger level which relates to the existing market access
opportunity... or, but not concurrently:
(b) the price at which imports of that product may enter the customs
territory of the Member granting the concession, as determined on
the basis of the c.i.f. import price of the shipment concerned ex-
pressed in terms of its domestic currency, falls below a trigger price
equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price for the product
concerned.
Id. art. 5:1(a), (b) (footnote omitted).
83. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5:4.
84. Id.
85. Id. art. 5:4(a).
86. Id. art. 5:4(b), (c).
87. "The reference price used to invoke the provisions ... shall, in general,
be the average c.i.f. unit value of the product concerned, or otherwise shall be
an appropriate price in terms of the quality of the product and its stage of
processing." Id. art. 5:1(b) n.2.
88. Id. art. 5:5.
89. Id.
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cial Safeguards Provision is similar to a variable levy and repre-
sents a serious deviation from liberalization. 90
Another exception to the market access requirements is the
Special Treatment clause. 91 Provisions within Annex 5 allow
countries to avoid tariffication of "qualified" products under cer-
tain conditions. Products qualify if they meet five criteria:
First, imports of a product must be less than 3% of domestic con-
sumption during the base period.92 Second, countries must not
have subsidized exports of the product since the beginning of the
base period.93 Third, effective domestic measures to restrict pro-
duction must be applied.94 Fourth, the products must be desig-
nated as subject to special treatment for non-trade concerns
such as food security or environmental protection. 95 Fifth, mini-
mum access for these products must equal 4% for the first year
of the implementation period and increase by 0.8% each year for
the remainder of the period.96 If imports of a product meeting
these five criteria increase at a rate beyond a certain level, tarif-
fication requirements do not apply.97 Alternatively, if a quali-
fied product is a traditional staple in the diet of a developing
country, tariffication is not required; however, minimum access
must initially be at least 1% of domestic consumption with equal
incremental increases to 4% over ten years.98
The greatest impediment to the trade liberalization of the
market access provisions is that countries overstated their tar-
iffs.99 The overstatement of tariffs has been labeled "dirty tarif-
fication." One study found that the tariffication procedures used
by a majority of countries resulted in significantly higher tariffs
than the estimated equivalents for the 1986-88 base period. 100
90. Hathaway & Ingco, supra note 82, at 21.
91. See Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 5; IATRC EVALUATION, supra note
66, at 9. The Special Treatment clause was included to allow Japan and Korea
to address political difficulties in opening up their rice markets. Id. Its provi-
sions are designed specifically for the conditions faced by these two countries.
Id. It applies, however, to all member nations. See Agreement, supra note 6,
Annex 5.
92. Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 5:1(a).
93. Id. Annex 5:1(b).
94. Id. Annex 5:1(c).
95. Id. Annex 5:1(d).
96. Id. Annex 5:1(e).
97. Id. Annex 5:1.
98. Id. Annex 5:7.
99. Tangermann, supra note 7, at 145.
100. Hathaway & Ingco, supra note 82, at 18-19. For example, the Eli's
declared tariffs were higher than the estimated tariff equivalents for eight of
nine major products; the United States used dirty tariflication for three prod-
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"The resulting tariffs of sometimes several hundred per cent
leave so little scope for the functioning of market forces, even
after being reduced by (at least) 15 per cent, that it is difficult to
argue that trade has been significantly liberalised."10 Although
dirty tariffication is less of an issue for original parties to the
WTO, as the conversion of their tariffs has already been negoti-
ated, it may prove to be an issue as new countries join the
WTO. 0 2
Dirty tariffication also increases the likelihood that coun-
tries will use the flexibility provided in reducing tariffs to mini-
mize trade liberalization.10 3 Because reductions are averaged
across all products and are not trade-weighted, an incentive ex-
ists for countries to protect sensitive products through divergent
tariff reductions. 10 4 This incentive is somewhat constrained by
the requirement that all tariffs be reduced by at least 15%.105
With dirty tariffication, however, a country may effectively avoid
liberalizing trade on some products without violating the provi-
sion.10 6 Such unbalanced levels of protection among products
allowed by the Agreement may lead to even more distortion in
trade flows. 10 7
B. EXPORT COMPETITION
The Agreement imposes two major requirements on export
subsidies.'0 8 Programs that constitute export subsidies include
payments-in-kind, subsidized stock exports, producer-financed
export subsidies, export marketing cost subsidies, export-spe-
ucts. Id. at 18. Norway's tariff equivalent for beef for the 1986-88 period was
145%. Id. tbl. 2b. Norway's declared tariff is 405%. Id. Interestingly, some
countries declared tariffs were lower than their estimated tariff equivalents.
Id. Japan's tariff estimate for beef, for example, was 87% and their declared
tariff is 38.5%. Id.
101. Tangermann, supra note 7, at 145.
102. Id. Dirty tariffication could be an especially important issue for large
markets such as China and countries within the former Soviet Union.
1(3. Id. at 146.
104. Id.
105. Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 5:6.
106. This tariff reduction loophole exists because the 36% reduction is not a
reduction of 36 tariff points, but rather a percentage of existing tariffs. Con-
sider, for example, a country with four tariffed agricultural products. Three of
the products have tariffs of 100% and one has a 4% tariff. The country must
reduce individual tariffs by at least 15%, which it does for the three high-tarif-
fed products. To meet the overall 36% reduction, it then reduces the tariff on
the 4% product by 100%. It has thus met the requirement of a 36% reduction,
but has only reduced tariffs on average by 12.25 points.
107. Tangermann, supra note 7, at 146.
108. Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 8, 9:1.
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cific transportation subsidies, and subsidies on goods incorpo-
rated into exports.' 0 9 First, nations are required to reduce their
existing export subsidies."l 0 Countries must reduce their
budget expenditures 1 ' (or revenues foregone) on export subsi-
dies by 36% over six years and the volume of subsidized exports
by 21%.112 Second, the Agreement prohibits nations from creat-
ing any new export subsidies on currently subsidized prod-
ucts.1 13 In addition, new subsidies may not be implemented for
agricultural products that were not subsidized in the base
period.114
109. Id. Under the Agreement, the following export subsidies are subject to
reduction commitments:
(a) the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies,
including payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers
of an agricultural product, to a cooperative or other association of
such producers, or to a marketing board, contingent on export
performance;
(b) the sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of
non-commercial stocks of agricultural products at a price lower
than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in
the domestic market;
(c) payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed
by virtue of governmental action, whether or not a charge on the
public account is involved, including payments that are financed
from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product con-
cerned or on an agricultural product from which the exported prod-
uct is derived;
(d) the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports
of agricultural products (other than widely available export promo-
tion and advisory services) including handling, upgrading and
other processing costs, and the costs of international transport and
freight;
(e) internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, pro-
vided or mandated by governments, on terms more favourable than
for domestic shipments;
(f) subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation
in exported products.
Id. art. 9:1.
110. Id.
111. For budgetary outlay reduction commitments, the budget reduced must
be "the maximum level of expenditure for such subsidies that may be allocated
or incurred in that year in respect of the agricultural product, or group of prod-
ucts, concerned." Id. art. 9:2(a)(i).
112. Id. art. 9:2(b)(iv). The quantity of agricultural exports to be reduced is
"the maximum quantity of an agricultural product, or group of products, in re-
spect of which such export subsidies may be granted in that year.' Id. art.
9:2(a)(ii). Developing countries need only reduce these expenditures by 24%
and 14%, respectively. Id. art. 9:2(b)(iv).
113. Id. art. 8.
114. Id. art. 3:3.
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
Export subsidy rules are important because they cap the fu-
ture subsidies a country may provide for an exported product. 115
"[Flor the first time in the history of the GATT there can no
longer be any doubts as to what (maximum) level of export sub-
sidies a country can grant in agricultural trade."116 To aid en-
forcement of these requirements, the exporting country has the
burden of proving compliance with the reductions or prohibi-
tions. 1 7 This burden of proof should also compel governments
to implement detailed reporting procedures to establish that aid
to producers is not tied to exports.
The dual requirement of reductions in budgetary outlays
and export volumes is extremely important. If required reduc-
tions in export subsidies are measured only by budget percent-
ages, then as trade increases, smaller subsidy expenditures can
subsidize greater quantities of exports. Conversely, in a shrink-
ing product market, if required reductions of subsidized exports
are measured only by volume, then greater expenditures could
be applied without decreasing the quantity of subsidized
exports.
An important consequence that is not evident from the
Agreement itself is the possibility that the export subsidy reduc-
tions create an incentive for some countries to eliminate their
export subsidies more rapidly than required. 1 8 This conse-
quence arises because the export subsidy reductions create two
groups of agricultural products available for sale on the interna-
tional market-subsidized exports and unsubsidized exports.
The quantity of subsidized exports is capped and declining for
all exporting countries. Since efficient producer countries will
dominate the expanding unsubsidized product market, they
have an incentive to eliminate export subsidies and concentrate
sales in the unsubsidized product market. 1 9 The efficient pro-
115. IATRC EVALUATION. supra note 66, at 10.
116. Id.
117. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 10:3. "Any Member which claims that
any quantity exported in excess of a reduction commitment level is not subsi-
dized must establish that no export subsidy ... has been granted in respect of
the quantity of exports in question." Id.
118. The concepts within this paragraph are developed from a discussion
with Robbin Johnson, Vice-President of Public Affairs, Cargill, Inc. (Feb. 8,
1995).
119. The critical assumption to this scenario is that profit margins are equal
within the unsubsidized and subsidized markets. Under typical subsidization
schemes which pay producers the difference between the market price and a
legislated price, profit margins will remain the same as long as the unsub-
sidized market price rises to at least the legislated price. Under subsidy
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ducer countries will absorb the newly unsubsidized market
share of the less efficient producer countries. Furthermore, sub-
sidy payments that adjust with market prices will automatically
decline as market prices rise. Producers receiving such subsi-
dies will be indifferent to their availability because their net re-
turn remains constant. Thus, trade liberalization may occur
more rapidly than the export subsidy commitments require.
Moreover, efficient producer countries also have an incentive to
negotiate larger export subsidy cuts in subsequent negotiations
since their export subsidies may have already decreased beyond
the required level.
C. DOMESTIC SUPPORT
The Agreement requires reductions in overall domestic sup-
port based on an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). 120 The
Agreement defines AMS as the annual level of support provided
for agricultural producers of specific products as well as support
for agricultural producers in general. 12 ' Essentially, AMS
quantifies all forms of agricultural support and creates a com-
posite figure used as the basis for cutbacks. 122 Prior to the sign-
ing of the Uruguay Round, each country calculated its AMS by
identifying the various programs with which it supports agricul-
ture.1 23 The Agreement requires each country to reduce its
AMS by a targeted 20% of budget over a six-year period. 124
Both direct budgetary outlays and foregone revenues are in-
cluded within the measure of AMS. 125 This prevents countries
from shifting direct payments to tax cuts based on production.
AMS includes support provided by the central government as
schemes which give producers a fixed subsidy, however, producers will strive to
remain in the subsidized market.
120. Agreement, supra note 6, art 6:1. The text of the AMS provision states:
"The domestic support reduction commitments of each Member... shall apply
to all of its domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers with
the excention of domestic measures which are not subject to reduction in terms
of the criteria set out in... this Agreement." Id.
121. Id. art. 1(a). AMS is defined specifically as "the annual level of support,
expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of
the producers of the basic agricultural product or non-product-specific support
provided in favour of agricultural producers in general, other than support pro-
vided under programmes that qualify as exempt." Id.
122. Tim Dickson, EC Heavyweights Clash Over Farm Reforms, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1990, at 3.
123. Id.
124. IATRC EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 13. The exact support reduction
depends on each country's schedule. See Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6:3.
125. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(c); see also id. Annex 3:2.
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well as support provided by regional and local governments. 126
This forces countries to either effect the reduction of local gov-
ernmental outlays to agriculture, or absorb the local outlays
with greater cuts in the central government's programs. 127
Countries must calculate AMS for each individual agricul-
tural product. 128 AMS thus aggregates measures which create
distortions in individual products rather than support given to
an aggregation of products. The requirement that support pro-
grams be measured for each product embodies a more rigid ap-
proach to identifying subsidies.
There are several advantages to a measure which calculates
all forms of support for agriculture and then requires across-the-
board cuts. First, it prevents production and trade-distorting
countries from eliminating trade barriers in one product area by
imposing them in others. Second, it continues to provide polit-
ical flexibility. AMS allows countries to maintain agricultural
policies that are more appealing by making larger cuts in other
less essential policies. The EU originally advocated AMS for
this specific reason.129 The United States opposed such a mea-
sure and instead wanted to concentrate on the elimination of ex-
port subsidies. 130 The AMS approach was ultimately adopted in
the Uruguay Round and represents an important stride in
breaking down global agricultural protectionism. The AMS ap-
proach recognizes that a variety of measures contribute to the
overproduction of agricultural products worldwide and thus pro-
vides a broader, more accurate measure of the agricultural sup-
port that may result in trade distortion. 131
There are several significant exceptions to AMS. The
Agreement first exempts any agricultural support of a product
126. Id. Annex 3:3.
127. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Cooper, Note, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking
Compliance with International Trade Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 143, 157 (1993).
128. Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 3:1.
129. Peter Torday, GATT Talks Floundering in Final Phase; Peter Torday
Reports on the Obstacles Blocking a Successful Uruguay Round Accord, THE
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 10, 1990, at 29.
130. David Brown, Gummer Leads the Fight Against U.S. Farm Price As-
sault, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library,
TELEGR File. The U.S. proposal also attacked domestic subsidies, albeit in a
slightly different way. The United States would have categorized domestic sub-
sidies into those that were minimally trade distorting and those which were
objectionable. The U.S. approach then called for cutting trade distortive meth-
ods while minimally trade distortive methods would be left untouched.
Tangermann, supra note 7, at 144.
131. See, e.g., Hathaway & Ingco, supra note 82, at 29.
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where the amount of support constitutes less than 5% of the to-
tal annual value of production. 132 This allows countries to ex-
clude products from inclusion in AMS where the support is
considered de minimis.133 A second exception to AMS require-
ments is the exclusion of both U.S. deficiency payments and EU
compensation payments. 134 Deficiency and compensation pay-
ments provide price insurance by paying producers the differ-
ence between a legislated target price and the market price. 135
The Agreement provides a third exception to AMS for
"green box" programs. 136 To be exempted, green box programs
must meet two criteria. First, support must be provided
through a publicly-funded government program which does not
involve transfers from consumers. 137 Second, the program must
not provide price support to producers. 138 Green box programs
are excluded because they are considered to be welfare enhanc-
ing and only minimally distortive. 139 They include programs
such as research, 140 extension, 141 inspection, 142 marketing, 143
infrastructure,'4 food security, 145 food aid,146 crop insurance
132. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6:4(a)(1). The percentage allowed for de-
veloping countries is 10%. Id. art. 6:4(b).
133. Id. art. 6:4.
134. IATRC EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 14.
135. See, e.g., Bruce L. Gardner, The United States, in AGRICULTURAL PRO-
TECTIONISM IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD 19, 35 (Fred H. Sanderson ed., 1990)
(describing U.S. deficiency payments); Hathaway & Ingco, supra note 82, at 7
(describing EU compensation payments).
136. Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 2; see IATRC EVALUATION, supra note
66, at 12.
137. Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 2:1(a).
138. Id. Annex 2:1(b).
139. Id. Annex 2:1.
140. Chairman's Note, supra note 80, Annex 4:2.
141. Extension programs are essentially advisory services which facilitate
the transfer of information and research findings to producers and consumers.
Id.
142. Inspection services include general inspection services and inspection
of particular products for health, safety, grading or standardization purposes.
Id.
143. Marketing and promotion services include "market information, advice
and promotion relating to particular products." Id. However, "expenditure[s]
for unspecified purposes that could be used by sellers to reduce their selling
price or confer a direct economic benefit to purchasers" are excluded from the
green box and are thereby included within AMS. Id.
144. Infrastructure services include "electricity reticulation, roads and other
means of transport, market and port facilities, water supply facilities, dams and
drainage schemes, and infrastructure related to environmental programs." Id.
145. Food security includes: "Expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation
to the accumulation and holding of stocks of products which form an integral
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and income safety-net schemes, 147 disaster payments, i 48 retire-
ment programs, 49 structural adjustment programs, 150 environ-
mental programs, 15 ' and decoupled income support.' 52 While
the green box exemptions and many other exceptions are not an
overt attempt to diminish the effectiveness of the Agreement,
they undoubtedly hinder the Agreement's immediate effective-
ness and necessitate future negotiation.
part of a food security programme identified in national legislation." Id. Annex
4:3.
146. Food aid must be provided to a portion of the domestic population in
need. In addition:
Eligibility to receive the food aid shall be subject to clearly-defined cri-
teria related to nutritional objectives. Such aid shall be in the form of
direct provision of food to those concerned or the provision of means to
allow eligible recipients to buy food either at market or at subsidized
prices. Food purchases by the government shall be made at current
market prices and the financing and administration of the aid shall be
transparent.
Id. Annex 4:4.
147. The amount of payments given as income insurance must relate solely
to income rather than the type of product produced. Id. Annex 4:7. Producers'
income must decrease by more than 30% in comparison to the previous three-
year period before they are eligible for payments. Id. The amount of compensa-
tion also may not exceed 70% of the total loss. Id.
148. Eligibility for disaster payments must follow a formal governmental
recognition of a disaster. Id. Annex 4:8. Losses must exceed 30% of the average
production for the preceding three-year period. Id. A disaster payments pro-
gram, like income safety schemes, must relate solely to income losses and may
not be product specific. Id.
149. Payments from retirement programs must be made "to facilitate the
retirement of persons engaged in marketable agricultural production, or their
movement to non-agricultural activities." Id. Annex 4:9. Payments must also
be conditioned upon the permanent retirement of such persons. Id.
150. Structural assistance through investment aids "shall be determined by
reference to clearly-defined criteria in government programmes designed to as-
sist the financial or physical restructuring of a producer's operations in re-
sponse to objectively demonstrated structural disadvantages." Id. Annex 4:11.
151. Payments under environmental programs "shall be determined as part
of a clearly-defined government environmental or conservation programme and
be dependent on the fulfillment of specific conditions under the government pro-
gramme, including conditions related to production methods or inputs." Id. An-
nex 4:12.
152. Decoupled income support payments, by definition, must be unrelated
to the type or volume of production of a particular producer. Id. Annex 4:6.
"Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria
such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production
level in a defined and fixed base period." Id.
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE WEAKNESSES AND ENFORCEMENT
DIFFICULTIES
The market access and export subsidies provisions of the
Agreement will have a substantial immediate impact on free
trade in agricultural products. As a quantification of domestic
subsidies, AMS represents an innovative mechanism to address
trade distortion. However, the degree of trade liberalization af-
forded by reductions in domestic support has been significantly
weakened by difficulties in enforcing the reductions. The first
primary difficulty with enforcing domestic support reductions is
the effect of the numerous exceptions within the Agreement.
The second is the complexity of implementing the provisions and
the political incentive for continuing support. The third diffi-
culty is the ability of the new WTO to enforce the provisions of
the Agreement.
A. AMS EXCEPTIONS
The difficulty with the AMS exceptions is the severe limit
they place on achieving meaningful reductions in domestic sup-
port. The most troublesome exception is that neither U.S. defi-
ciency payments nor EU compensation payments under the
reformed Common Agricultural Policy are included in AMS.'5 3
Deficiency payments in the United States and compensation
payments in the EU represent the largest expenditures on agri-
culture in these two countries. 5 4 In the United States, for ex-
ample, deficiency payments comprise over 70% of domestic
agricultural subsidies. 155 The Dunkel Draft of the Agreement
included both programs as trade distortive subsidies subject to
reduction.' 5 6 They were later exempted as concessions to the
153. Deficiency and compensation payments are similar in that they work to
provide price insurance by paying producers the difference between a legislated
target price and the market price. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
Deficiency and compensation payments were excepted by the Blair House
Agreement. Hathaway & Ingco, supra note 82, at 12. The negotiations result-
ing in the Blair House Agreement dealt with problematic issues from the
Dunkel Draft. Id. at 11.
154. The EU compensation payments are new under the Common Agricul-
tural Policy. IATRC EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 43. Their exception from
AMS reduction commitments means that AMS has no policy significance for the
EU. Id. at 46.
155. In 1990, the United States spent over $9 billion in direct payments to
farmers, of which $6.8 billion was for deficiency payments. U.S. GEN. AccT.
OFF., AGRICULTURE PAYMENTS: NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING 1990 DEFI-
CIENCY PAYMENTS AND THE AMOUNTS 8 (1992).
156. Hathaway & Ingco, supra note 82, at 9.
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two key parties.15 7 This exception serves as the death knell for
the immediate effectiveness of domestic support reductions.
Green box exceptions also limit meaningful reduction of do-
mestic support. Despite the Agreement's requirement that
green box policies have "no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting
effects,"158 some specified programs clearly distort trade.15 9 An
income insurance program, for example, has appreciable effects
on the agricultural sector. Such a program makes crop produc-
tion more financially attractive by providing an income floor and
reducing the risk of an inadequate income. As a result, market
forces fail to drive inefficient production factors from the agricul-
tural sector, and surpluses once again result. While the level of
protection varies among green box exceptions, the Agreement
lists numerous programs that presumably qualify and thereby
undermines the fundamental requirement that programs have
no or at most minimal trade distortive effects. Furthermore, a
country which utilizes multiple green box programs could cumu-
latively cause excessive trade distortion.
AMS exceptions may ultimately provide governments with
the ability to avoid reducing agricultural support. The excep-
tions thus thwart the immediate effectiveness of AMS reduction
commitments. The importance of AMS, however, lies not in its
immediate effect, but in the groundwork it lays. AMS commit-
ments formally restrict countries' internal budgetary priorities
and resultant policies related to agriculture. AMS provisions
are also important because they establish ceilings beyond which
countries may not subsidize. Despite numerous exceptions, the
AMS approach creates predictability in the amount and type of
trade distortive domestic policies countries can utilize. Most im-
portantly, AMS provisions provide the basis for future negotia-
tion of subsidies reduction and exception elimination.
B. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLICATIONS
Notwithstanding the weakening effect of the exceptions to
AMS, additional complications arise from the use of a broad
measure of support. Political inertia creates the incentive to
preserve more trade distortive measures. Furthermore, a mea-
157. Id. at 12.
158. IATRC EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 12.
159. Admittedly, some green-box policies are not as trade distortive.
Decoupled income support, for example, will not encourage production. It
merely encourages persons to become part of the qualified group, in this case,
farmers. The direct outlay of fimds, such as welfare payments, are not trade
distortive and not a historical concern of the GATT.
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sure that broadly addresses domestic support requires more ex-
acting enforcement mechanisms than those previously utilized
under the GATT.
AMS is politically appealing because it creates the advan-
tages of flexibility and choice. The corresponding danger, how-
ever, is that different domestic support policies vary in their
degree of trade distortion. 160 An equivalent cut in funds ex-
pended on support policies will not necessarily result in
equivalent reductions in trade distortion for each country. 161
Thus, reduction commitments based on AMS create an incentive
to retain trade distortive programs.
The danger is exacerbated by the fact that the most politi-
cally appealing programs are typically the most protectionist. 1 6 2
Cutting subsidization of land substitutes, for instance, has the
greatest effect on trade liberalization. 163 "The logic of this prop-
osition rests on the assumption that agricultural land is the con-
straining factor on the long-run output of the farm sector."16 4
Because farmers' wealth is concentrated primarily in land, how-
ever, politicians are loathe to detract from that wealth and upset
the powerful farm lobbies. Legislatures are also concerned
about the effects of disrupting employment in the agricultural
sector by cutting certain subsidies. 165 Although removing sup-
port from input factors has the greatest impact on trade liberali-
zation,166 it also significantly decreases employment in the farm
160. Thomas W. Hertel, PSEs and the Mix of Measures to Support Farm
Incomes, 12 WORLD ECON. 17, 22 (1989). A subsidy for an input that is a substi-
tute for land will increase production at a greater rate than the same amount
expended on an output subsidy. Id. at 20. As other factors of production are
subsidized, production can increase with less capital investment in land. Id. at
23. This in turn raises the value of land and the net worth of the owners of land
(usually farmers). Id.
161. A cut in grain subsidies, for example, will have less of an impact on
production than an equivalent cut on expenditures subsidizing fertilizer. Id. at
20.
162. Politically popular protectionism is protectionism that works. For ex-
ample, quotas on rice imports have been established in countries such as Japan,
Korea, and the Philippines for generations. Since rice is the primary staple of
diets in these three countries, quotas, the scourge of the GATT, have been used
extensively to protect rice producers. These countries insisted that a special
provision be inserted within the Agreement to allow these quotas to remain in
place. IATRC EVALUATION, supra note 66, at 9; see supra notes 91-98 for a
discussion of the Special Treatment clause.
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
164. Hertel, supra note 160, at 20.
165. See id. at 21.
166. Id. Hertel summarizes the differences between input and output subsi-
dies in the ways they affect factor prices facing individual farms:
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sector. 167 Politicians instead seek to cut output subsidies which
have less of an impact on employment in the agricultural sector.
Given the political inertia for protectionist policies, enforc-
ing the Agreement could prove to be a daunting task. The ques-
tion of enforcement raises several issues, each of which could
prevent the Agreement from minimizing trade distortion. Coun-
tries may have inflated their AMS estimates prior to the Agree-
ment to more easily achieve reduction requirements. Inflation
of AMS figures clearly undermines the effectiveness of the
Agreement. It delays the effect of the Agreement in eliminating
trade distorting mechanisms by postponing true domestic sup-
port reductions. Also, countries may focus on "accounting" com-
pliance rather than "real" compliance to the reduction
commitments. Either possibility casts a dim future for the po-
tential effectiveness of the Agreement.
A further issue concerns the lack of reporting and verifica-
tion procedures. Currently, there are no procedures in place by
which a team of experts can audit agricultural support programs
of individual countries. Naturally, countries have an incentive
to monitor each other. Competing countries will monitor reports
issued by other countries and institute a GATT proceeding when
they believe a country is not in compliance. Relying on self-po-
licing, however, creates informational problems because domes-
tic subsidies data is particularly difficult for an outside country
to gather and verify. An independent team of analysts is needed
to examine and verify individual budgets and expenditures to
determine whether individual countries are in compliance. Fre-
quent physical inspections are also necessary to ensure that ex-
penditures are not being routed to other agricultural sectors or
areas that have been determined to cause trade distortion.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the reforms instituted by the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture cannot be understated. Agri-
cultural protectionism increased from the early 1970s until the
Over time [the difference between input and output subsidies] tends to
result in farm operators changing the mix of inputs which they choose
to employ. For example, subsidized credits, such as those provided to
Brazilian agriculture, tend to induce a more capital-intensive form of
production than would otherwise prevail .... In general, input subsi-
dies encourage additional production.
Id. Although this is also the case with an output subsidy, the output subsidy is
less prone to alter the mix of inputs used in producing the commodity. Id.
167. Id.
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Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round slows the growth of agri-
cultural protectionism and in some ways reverses it. The mar-
ket access and export subsidy provisions in particular represent
huge strides as they require that agricultural products be
treated similarly to manufactured products. These two provi-
sions will also have the greatest immediate impact on trade lib-
eralization of agriculture. AMS represents a new approach
within the GATT for addressing global trade distortion and its
implications liberalize trade in agriculture to an even greater
extent than manufacturing. Because of exceptions within AMS
and the complications of enforcing compliance, however, AMS is
unlikely to have an immediate impact.
The success of the Agreement may depend on the dispute
resolving ability of the WTO. An early dispute will almost cer-
tainly involve either the EU or the United States. The WTO's
fortitude against these trading giants will foreshadow the
Agreement's immediate effectiveness. Detecting and addressing
violations of the Agreement will be a complex endeavor. Given
the incentive of countries to maintain agricultural protection-
ism, it is questionable whether the provisions will be enforced.
These obstacles make it unlikely that the AMS provisions of
the Agreement will have an immediate effect on protectionist ag-
riculture policies. The dialogue that occurred in the Uruguay
Round does, however, represent a large step in comparison to
the attention agriculture received in previous rounds. Thus, the
significance of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture is
that it stems protectionism and provides a basis for further
negotiation.
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